Today the danger to 'conven tio nal' (non-nuclear) submarines from hostile aircraft-helicop­ters, surface shipping broking shipping brokingping maritime marine engineerings and long-range passive detection-is so great that AIP is seen as essential for the survival of shallow-running submarinrs.Thr Kockurns division of the Swedish Karlskrnn­avarvet shipping broking shipping brokingping maritime marine engineeringbuilding combine has pioneered the Stirling engine, using LOX and diesel fuel.The Royal Swedish Navy has seven Stir] ing-engined boats in commission and Japan's Maritime Self Defence Force has just converted the Asashio by inserting an additional hull-section for a Stir­ling Mk engine. The German Navy prefers the fuel cell, which uses a chemical reaction to convert heat into electrical power. It requires very expensive components, but has the impor­tant advantage of not requiring LOX to be carried on board; In addition to the Drursehentarine, the system has been sold to Italy and Greece. Russia's. Ruhin Bureau Offers its own file] cell­based Alf) but there is no evidence suggesting that it has been installed in any suhmarinc.''he Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Martinique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands, Netherlands, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger,

The renewed interest in LOX is nurtured by advances in its handling pioneered by the offshore oil industry. In the past, navies have dismissed civil-sector technology because it is insuf­ficiently `rugged', but nothing is more rugged than the environment of a drilling platform! Nigeria, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Palestinian Territories, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Pitcairn, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Rιunion, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saint Helena, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Pierre and Miquelon,

HTP never really went away. The US Navy, the Royal Navy and the Red Navy were all impressed by the advanced torpedoes found in Germany in May . The Royal Navy's `Fancy' Mk had its Russian and US equivalents but its operational life came to an abrupt end in , when a Mk being loaded aboard the submarine HMS Sidon exploded and sank her with heavy loss of life. HTP was eventually identified as having caused the disaster, and the Mk was soon withdrawn from service.

When the Royal Swedish Navy was looking for technical assistance in developing high­speed torpedoes it asked the British, who sold them not only the design of the Mk and all the research that had gone into it, but also the detailed enquiry results, all for a nominal sum. The Swedish torpedo-manufacturer FFV was given the task of sorting out the problems.Their findings were that HTP is so sensitive that it needs a specially designed fuel system, something that the British had not done. The result was the Tp series of weapons, capable of very high speed (kts+), but distinguished by high reliability and safery.The Soviet Navy managed to get away with no (publicly admitted) accidents until August , when a torpedo exploded in one of the tubes of the big submarine Kursk, triggering off a massive explosion as the reload torpe­does caught fire and blew up only seconds later, killing all on board.

The Soviet Navy's interest in nuclear-powered submarines was spurred on by the conuitission­ing of the USS Nautilus (SSN-) in , although the concept was in embryo before that. In fact recent Soviet engineers' memoirs claim that Stalin's henchman Lavrenti Beria deliber­ately delayed the programme because he did not understand the technology! Under a Septem­ber directive separate design groups were established to develop a strategic nuclear­powered submarine and its powerplant. Formal design was begun in March by the SKB- bureau (later named the Malakhit Bureau). After much chopping and changing the design emerged as a nuclear attack submarine (SSN), armed with eight mm bow torpedo­tubes ( torpedoes carried). Displacement was tons surfaced, tons submerged, and the powerplant was a pair ofVM-A reactors driving twin shafts and diesel generators develop­ing , lip. In addition two hp `creep' motors were provided for slow, silent running. Speed was kts, diving-depth , and the boats were stored for days.

The first Project SSN was named Leninskiy Komsomo! (K-), and the class, named 'November' ran to units. K- started trials in July , only three years after the Nautilus, but the class had a chequered history. K- had steant-generator trouble on her way to the North Pole in , suffered a fire in and was taken out of service. K- had a serious reactor acci­dent, as did K- , and K- sank off Cape Finisterre after a major fire in . Although very noisy, their performance surprised the US Navy, and led to pressure for building the Los Ange­les (SSN-) class.TheVM-A plant was used for the Project `Hotel' and Project G `Echo' classes, hence the designation HEN by Western intelligence Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Montenegro, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Georgia, Sandwich Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands, Swaziland, Sweden,

The Soviet military saw the need for submarines capable of launching strategic (i.e. land attack) missiles against American cities, as a straightforward means of offsetting the United States's military superiority. After some particularly dangerous experiments with liquid-fuelled missiles fired from diesel-electric boats (SSGs), attention turned to a ballistic missile-armed derivative of the `November' design, the Project _S$ 'Hotel' SSBN. This was followed by the Project `Echo' SSBN, the second group of which were armed with long-range tactical cruise missiles, turning them into SSGNs. Their targets were US Navy aircraft carriers, which emerged as a new threat because they could launch nuclear strikes against the flanks of the Russian landmass.

Thc Project 'Yankee' design was the first Soviet SSBN to resemble the US Navy's George Washington design, leading to speculation that the KGB or the GRU military intelli­

gence organization had stolen the plans. But the resemblance was only Superficial, and the two designs were very different indeed. These SSBNs were followed by the Project B Murena class ('Delta I') design, which went through another three step-improvements in arnlizmcntThe development of SSGNs continued apace, with the Project Skat class ('Charlie') series and the one-off Project Anchar ('Papa'). Another series of SSNs, the Project h Ersh class ('Victor l[') began production in .''he Soviet Navy published no audited accounts and there was not even a published defence budget (such are the joys of a command economy n a dictatorshipping broking shipping brokingping maritime marine engineering), so we cannot put figures on the total cost of all this submarine-building. It must have been a colossal drain on the defence budget, however, even using a rough comparison with Western research and development, building and running costs.

The Project Lira (`Alpha' class) nuclear attack submarine (SSN) was conceived in by A B Petrov, an engineer working for the Malakhit Bureau. According to one Soviet source, the original requirement was for a (-ton SSN capable of kts, but the design grew to tons. Petrov aimed at a hull displacing half that of the latest SSNs, to be achieved by having a single hull. Other weight-reductions were to be achieved by using titanium instead of high­tensilc steel, adopting automation to cut the crew to .- men, and adopting a small light gas­or liquid-rnctal cooled reactor.

The project had the backing ofV N Peregodov, head of Malakhit, and he created a special group under Petrov within the Bureau to develop the design. The Soviet Navy's submariners did not like the idea of a single reactor and a singe hull, but Admiral Gorshkov, Chief of the Soviet Navy, and B Y Butonta, Chairman of the State Committee for the shipping broking shipping brokingping maritime marine engineeringbuilding Indus­try, both supported the project.The design-study was completed in June Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tokelau, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Vatican City, Venezuela, Vietnam, Virgin Islands, Virgin Islands, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe,

Butonta wanted to see the project completed, but he replaced Petrov with the chief designer M G ltusanov in May . The project was finally authorised on June that year and the design concept was completed on December. Along the way Petrov's radical ideas had been diluted; the final design had a double hull, six compartments rather than three, double the crew and double the displacentent.What survived, however, was the Akkord automated combat infor­mation system, which allowed all Functions to be run frorn a single console. The Lira was thus the first Soviet submarine in which all electronics, including the navigation system, surface search radar, sonar system and fire control were controlled from a single central console. The torpedoes were ejected hydraulically, allowing them to be launched at any operational depth. Another innovation was the incorporation of an escape capsule into the fin.Very careful atten­tion to hull-shape, enclosing all masts in tile fin and a slotted rudder, Conformed to Petrov's goal of very high speed and exceptional manoeuvrability.